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THE ARTICLE III FISCAL POWER
Adam Rosenzweig*
Imagine that the United States faces an unprecedented
Constitutional crisis. Earlier in the year, Congress authorized the
President to spend $3 trillion, comprised of $1 trillion in defense
spending to fund a war duly authorized by Congress, another $1
trillion of interest on debt incurred by the United States also
duly authorized by Congress, and another $1 trillion of Medicare
expenses (which are mandatory under existing law duly enacted
by a previous Congress). As the end of the year approaches, the
President realizes that the United States will not have enough
money to pay all these bills, leading to a choice: should the
President (1) decline to prosecute a duly authorized military
conflict, (2) fail to pay interest on duly authorized and issued
national debt, (3) fail to make duly authorized and mandatory
Medicare payments, or (4) borrow an additional $1 trillion to
cover the shortfall? The President chooses option (4), and thus
requests the authority from Congress to issue $1 trillion of debt.
But this time Congress refuses, denying the President the power
to issue the debt. What options remain?
This hypothetical represents a simplified version of the so-called
“debt ceiling” standoff between Congress and President Obama in
2011. The resolution at the time was a compromise (of sorts) to raise
the statutory debt limit in exchange for certain promises to cut
spending in the future. But what if Congress had stood its ground?
Either the President could violate the Constitutional obligation to
faithfully execute the laws by failing to spend duly authorized funds
or violate the separation of powers by issuing debt without
Congressional authorization. A real Constitutional crisis seems to
1
emerge, with no way out. Or is there?
* Professor of Law, Washington University in Saint Louis. The author would like to
thank Neil Buchanan, John Drobak, Bruce LaPierre, Ronald Levin, Greg Magarian, and
the participants at the 2013 Annual Critical Tax Conference and the UNLV Faculty
Speaker Series for the extremely valuable and insightful comments on earlier versions of
this essay. Any errors are solely those of the author.
1. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson and Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crises, 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 707 (2009) (referring to this as a Type II Constitutional Crisis).
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As most American schoolchildren learn in civics class, the
United States government is comprised of three branches: the
legislative, the executive, and the judicial. So if the legislative
and executive cannot—or will not—comply with their
Constitutional obligations, what about the judiciary? Could a
federal court itself, under its own authority, satisfy the
Constitution if the other branches won’t? Typically, when the
Executive violates the Constitution the solution is for the
Supreme Court to order the Executive to fulfill its Constitutional
obligations. But in the hypothetical above this would not be
sufficient; even if it wanted to, the Supreme Court couldn’t order
the President to spend money the country didn’t have, nor could
it order Congress to pass a new statute to authorize debt or
2
withdraw appropriations.
The thesis of this Essay is that, under certain limited
circumstances, the Supreme Court can, under its own,
independent, power under Article III of the Constitution,
impose taxes and borrow money, wholly separate from the
powers of Congress to do so under Article I or any potential
3
powers of the President to do so under Article II.
While at first glance this may seem like an odd, or even
outrageous, contention, in fact the Supreme Court has
recognized the inherent power of federal courts to do something
strikingly similar over twenty years ago in the case of Missouri v.
4
Jenkins. In that case, the school district of Kansas City,
Missouri, was ordered to undertake certain spending to comply
5
with Brown v. Board of Education (“Brown I”). The school
district passed a new property tax to do so, but the state of
Missouri passed a law withdrawing the taxing power from the
school district, making the tax increase null and void. The district
court found the state’s actions unconstitutional, and ordered the
school district to collect the tax and spend the money. In other
words, the court itself ordered the imposition and collection of a
2. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109
YALE L.J. 87 (1999).
3. This is distinct from the claim that the courts take fiscal matters into account in
making their decisions. See NANCY STAUDT, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE PURSE:
HOW COURTS FUND NATIONAL DEFENSE IN TIMES OF CRISIS (2011).
4. 495 U.S. 33 (1990). Due to the procedural history of the case, this opinion is
often referred to as Jenkins II. Jenkins I involved a review of attorney’s fees, Missouri v.
Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989), and Jenkins III involved the review of desegregation orders
across districts, Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995). For simplicity, this Essay will
refer to Jenkins II as Jenkins as it only focuses on the question of the judicial taxation
decree at issue in that case.
5. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown I].
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tax that was not authorized by state law. On appeal, the
Supreme Court effectively held that this was within the inherent
6
power of the district court to remedy Constitutional violations.
Jenkins understandably caused quite an uproar at the time,
although much of the commentary focused on the aspect of the
case related to the power of federal courts over states and
7
localities, while others on the more limited issue of enforcement
8
of school desegregation. But on the face of the opinion, neither
is necessarily correct. Rather, in Jenkins the Supreme Court
held that when a law-making body authorizes spending, then
refuses to allocate the resources to meet this spending, and,
crucially, the failure to do so violates the Constitution, the
courts have the independent power to raise the money directly
to remedy the Constitutional violation, irrespective of
9
legislative authority to do so.
This fact pattern seems almost identical to the hypothetical
at the beginning of this Essay. Congress authorizes spending by
statute, the President—Constitutionally obligated to execute
that law—tries to undertake the spending, but then Congress
effectively withdraws the ability from the President to do so. If
10
failure to spend the money would violate the Constitution,
Jenkins would seem to stand for the proposition that the Court
could order the President to raise and spend the money. Taken
to an even further extreme, the Court could itself raise the
money and provide it to the President to spend, either through
taxing or borrowing, to avoid the Constitutional violation.
Not only would recognition of such a power fundamentally
alter any future debates over taxing and spending, it could
potentially offer a way out of the policy and political stalemate
facing the country. After all, if both Congress and the President
6. As discussed in more detail below, the Supreme Court held that the district
court should have given the school district an opportunity to enact its own tax before
doing so itself under principles of comity. See generally D. Bruce LaPierre, Enforcement
of Judgments Against State and Local Governments: Judicial Control Over the Power to
Tax, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 299 (1992).
7. Id. note 6.
8. See, e.g., Jose Felipe Anderson, Perspectives on Missouri v. Jenkins:
Abandoning the Unfinished Business of Public School Desegregation “With All Deliberate
Speed”, 39 HOW. L.J. 693 (1996); The Honorable David S. Tatel, Judicial Methodology,
Southern School Desegregation, and the Rule of Law, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1071 (2004).
9. This is in contrast to the ruling in Jenkins III, which held that specifying the type
and location of schools across districts was inappropriate. 515 U.S. at 133.
10. See, e.g., Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); see generally Gerard
N. Magliocca, The Gold Clause Cases and Constitutional Necessity, 64 F LA . L.
R EV. 1243 (2012).
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knew that doing nothing would lead to five justices of the
Supreme Court choosing how to fund the government, the odds
of a stalemate would be reduced dramatically. Perhaps the
recognition of the existence of such a power could itself force the
government out of its rut and return a real balance of power to
the coordinate branches of government.
To this end, Part I of this Essay will summarize and describe
the facts and holding of Missouri v. Jenkins, demonstrating the
already recognized Article III power to tax. Part II will then
describe why and how the logic and reasoning of Jenkins can and
should apply with equal, if not stronger, force to the federal
government as opposed to state legislatures.
I.

MISSOURI V. JENKINS: RECOGNIZING THE
JUDICIAL POWER TO TAX

Prior to the landmark decision of Brown I, the schools of
the State of Missouri (“Missouri”) were legally segregated by
11
race. The decision in Brown effectively struck down the de jure
segregation of schools, but as with many school districts across
the country this did not mean the end to de facto school
segregation. In response, the Supreme Court ordered, in Brown
12
II, that the district courts enforce the mandate of Brown I by
using their broad equitable powers to undo the vestiges of de
jure segregation in schools.
In 1977, certain parents and students sued Missouri and the
Kansas City Missouri School District (“KCMSD”) for failing to
comply with the mandates of Brown and undertake the efforts
necessary to ameliorate the effects of the previous de jure
13
segregation. Pursuant to Brown II, in 1984 the district court
agreed and ordered KCMSD to undertake a number of efforts to
remediate the existing de facto segregation in the district,
including remedial education programs in underserved schools
14
and capital improvements in facilities.
The problem faced by KCMSD was that it did not have
enough money to comply with the district court’s order. Of
course, this is a problem that is conceptually easy to remedy—
KCMSD could simply raise taxes. The problem with this remedy
is that Missouri, in the interim, had adopted rules effectively
11.
12.
13.
14.

See LaPierre, supra note 6.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) [hereinafter Brown II].
See LaPierre, supra note 6.
Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F.Supp. 400 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
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prohibiting KCMSD from doing so. 15 The intention of this was
clear. Missouri, having already lost one school desegregation
case in Saint Louis and clearly sensing that it would lose in
Kansas City, took away the taxing power from KCMSD so that,
even if it lost, it would not be able to comply with any district
16
court orders requiring new funding.
This put the district court in a difficult position. The
Supreme Court had clearly mandated that the court use its broad
equitable powers to enforce Brown, and the court had found
that KCMSD was not in compliance with Brown, but it could not
order KCMSD to impose new taxes because KCMSD was
prohibited by state law from doing so. The solution adopted by
the district court, relying in part on the Saint Louis case, was to
strike down the state law limiting the KCMSD taxing power as a
17
violation of Brown. In the Saint Louis case, this alone was
sufficient because the Saint Louis school district had already
increased its taxes, which therefore became effective as soon as
the state law had been found unconstitutional. Thus, striking
down the state cap effectively raised sufficient taxes to comply
with the court’s order. The difficulty in the KCMSD situation
was that the state cap had been put in place before the KCMSD
tax increase had been approved. Thus, merely striking down the
cap was not sufficient.
The district court once again found itself in a bind. This
time, however, the court had no precedent upon which to draw.
Instead, the court fashioned its own remedy, taking up the call in
Brown II to use its equitable powers as necessary. The district
court ordered KCMSD to adopt a new property tax and, in the
interim, ordered that a new income and property tax be imposed
under its own inherent power, and in addition, that $150 million
of new bonds be issued, all in direct contravention to the
18
Missouri Constitution.
As has been widely noted, states and localities are
particularly sensitive to federal courts telling them how to tax
19
their own citizens. But the order in the KCMSD case went even
15. See LaPierre, supra note 6.
16. See LaPierre, supra note 6. See also Kevin Little, Missouri v. Jenkins: Exploring
the Judicial Limits of the Supremacy Clause, 8 HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 137 (1991).
17. Jenkins, 672 F. Supp. at 403.
18. Id. at 412.
19. See LaPierre, supra note 6; see also Randall T. Shepard, In a Federal Case, Is the
State Constitution Something Important or Just Another Piece of Paper?, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1437 (2005).
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beyond that. Missouri was concerned that if the order in
KCMSD was upheld, federal courts would be able to impose
their own taxes directly on the citizens of states without the
approval, or even the input, of the state governments
themselves. On this basis, Missouri appealed to the Eighth
Circuit, claiming that the order in KCMSD exceeded the district
court’s authority.
The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court order in large
20
part. The primary issues on which it did not agree with the
district court were: (1) the Circuit court struck down the income
tax surcharge adopted by the district court, and (2) the Circuit
court held that KCMSD should be permitted, as an initial
matter, to set the rate of property tax to further federal/state
21
comity. Under the doctrine of federal/state comity, the federal
government should avoid intruding on matters traditionally
within the jurisdiction of the states, even if there is a legitimate
federal interest, to avoid potentially undermining the state
22
sovereignty implicit in a federal system. Thus, the Eighth
Circuit found that directly choosing the rate was the line which,
if crossed, would violate comity by introducing the federal court
into state and local matters, regardless of if the court had the
power to do so.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the majority substantially
upheld the Eighth Circuit, agreeing that the district court should
not have ordered the income tax surcharge and also agreeing
that the district court should not have directly imposed a tax on
23
KCMSD. Importantly, however, the majority opinion agreed
with the Eighth Circuit that ordering KCMSD to impose a
property tax and following procedures permitting the district to
determine the appropriate rate would be within the power of the
district court. Thus, the order that KCMSD implement a
24
property tax increase and bond issuance was upheld.
A concurring opinion, signed by four Justices, disagreed
with the majority on this last point. In particular, the concurring
opinion noted that, in effect, there was no difference between a
court directly ordering a tax increase and a court ordering that a
25
locality enact a tax increase. Either way, the court was ordering
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988).
Id.
See, e.g., Shepard, supra note 19.
Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 37 (1990).
Id. at 51.
Id. at 62 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

1 - THE ARTICLE III FISCAL POWER_ROSENZWEIG (DO NOT DELETE)

2014]

3/17/2014 11:07 AM

THE ARTICLE III FISCAL POWER

133

a tax under its own inherent authority. The Justices concurred in
the judgment, however, even though they believed the tax to be
outside the court’s authority, because they found the tax issue to
26
be outside the scope of the case on appeal.
Importantly, however, the concurring opinion did agree
with the majority opinion on one key issue: that the issue in the
case ultimately came down to a question of federal/state comity.
In other words, both the majority and the concurrence ruled that
the district court should not have exercised its existing and broad
inherent powers in deference to the state sovereignty inherent in
state and local taxation. Thus, in effect, the Court unanimously
agreed that federal courts could have the power to impose taxes
or issue bonds, the only question in the Jenkins case being
whether doing so had intruded into traditional areas of state and
27
local sovereignty.
This core holding of Jenkins has been underappreciated for
over two decades. Rather than being an odd outlier limited to
the unique facts of the post-Brown school desegregation cases,
Jenkins represents the clear and unanimous recognition by the
Supreme Court of a vibrant, robust Article III power to tax and
spend to remedy Constitutional violations under specific and
particular circumstances. The next section will consider these
circumstances in more detail.
II. THE JUDICIAL FISCAL POWER: EXTENDING
JENKINS TO THE FEDERAL CO-ORDINATE
BRANCHES
Return to the hypothetical at the beginning of this Article.
Congress has authorized spending but not the means to raise the
money to undertake this spending. Clearly a fiscal crisis, and
potentially a Constitutional crisis, has arisen. But what does
Jenkins have to do with this?
In fact, when looked at closely, Jenkins is directly on point.
This can be seen more clearly by specifically delineating the holding
in Jenkins and distinguishing it from the dicta. In so doing, a clear
path to application to the federal co-ordinate branches emerges.
26. Id. at 80 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
27. See John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor’s Foot? The Inherent
Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1134 (1996) (“[Jenkins]
did not invalidate the order on the grounds that it was inconsistent with Article III, the
Tenth Amendment, or principles of federalism. Instead, the Court held that the district
court had gone too far because, rather than impose the tax increase itself, it should have
ordered the school district to do so instead”).
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The following represents the logical steps necessary to the
holding of Jenkins:
1. A Constitutional violation has occurred;
2. Federal courts have the power to order a remedy to
the Constitutional violation;
3. Another branch effectively undermines the ability of
the federal courts to implement the remedy;
4. If so, the courts have the inherent power under
Article III of the Constitution to impose the remedy
directly.
From this perspective, the holding in Jenkins makes perfect
sense. In fact, every Justice considering Jenkins agreed to these
logical steps. First, Missouri and KCMSD violated the
Constitution by legally segregating the schools. Second, the
Supreme Court recognized in Brown II that the federal courts
have the power to remedy this violation through affirmative
actions such as ordering busing and ordering facility upgrades.
Third, Missouri attempted to undermine this power by revoking
the ability of KCMSD to raise taxes to pay for these actions.
Fourth, the federal courts have the inherent power to strike
down the undermining law as unconstitutional and order that the
taxes be adopted to implement the remedy.
There is no reason this cannot be extrapolated to more
current debates. 28 With respect to the Constitutional questions,
the bulk of the literature considering the debt ceiling showdowns
has already focused on precisely these issues, and thus this
section can serve mostly as a review of that literature as a
predicate to engaging in the broader judicial taxation point.
First, a Constitutional violation has occurred. In this case, it is
one of the following: (1) Congress prevented the President from
faithfully executing the law under Article II, (2) Congress
questioned the validity of the public debt under Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Second, the Supreme Court has ruled
that the federal courts have the power to remedy such
Constitutional violations. Third, any remedy to be adopted by
the federal courts would require either taxing or spending, each
of which Congress has prohibited. Fourth, the federal courts

28. See James D. Ridgway, Equitable Power in the Time of Budget Austerity: The
Problem of Judicial Remedies for Unconstitutional Delays in Claims Processing by
Federal Agencies, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 57 (2012).
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must have the inherent power to force Congress to adopt some
fiscal provision to prevent the Constitutional violation.
The remainder of this Section will discuss each of these
logical steps in order.
A.THE CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION
1. Article II
Section 3 of Article II of the Constitution provides that the
President of the United States “shall take Care that the Laws be
29
faithfully executed.” This has been interpreted to mean that the
30
President is obligated to enforce the laws adopted by Congress.
But what happens when the President cannot comply with all of
the laws enacted by Congress at the same time? In such a
situation, the President simply cannot comply with the
Constitutional mandate to faithfully execute the law without
violating another provision of the Constitution, specifically that
only Congress has the power to impose taxes or authorize
31
spending.
More specifically, the President faces three duly enacted
and valid federal laws: (1) mandated spending such as interest
due on public debt, entitlement programs like Social Security
and Medicare, and discretionary spending such as military and
Health and Human Services, (2) insufficient revenue raised from
duly enacted taxes, and (3) a prohibition on issuing new debt.
Thus, the President has only three choices: (1) fail to undertake
duly authorized spending, (2) raise revenue not authorized by
Congress, or (3) issue new debt in excess of the limit on public
32
debt. All three are unconstitutional.
Thus, Congress has duly enacted valid laws that, when taken
together, force the President to violate the Constitutional
obligation of faithfully executing the laws.
This can be seen even more starkly through a simpler
example. Assume Congress in 2004 authorized the federal
government to pay for insulin for all American citizens with
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
30. See Parker Rider-Longmaid, Comment, Take Care That the Laws Be Faithfully
Executed, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 291 (2012).
31. See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least
Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) From the Debt Ceiling
Standoff, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1175 (2012).
32. See id. at 1196–97 (referring to this as the “trilemma”).
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diabetes. They expect this will cost $100 million per year each
year and thus Congress appropriates $100 million to pay for
insulin under this program. At the same time, Congress forbids
any tax revenue from being used to pay for the insulin. Now the
President must either fail to comply with the spending mandate
or violate the funding restriction. Or, if one prefers, in 2004
Congress authorizes the President to fight a war with Iraq and
adopts a sufficient appropriation to pay for the war, but then
adopts a law mandating that the war not add to the federal debt.
The idea is the same.
Some may contend this is, in fact, not a Constitutional
violation. Rather, all that is required from the President is that
the law be faithfully executed, not perfectly executed. Thus, the
President could pay the bills as they come in and then stop
paying the bills once the money runs out. Since this would be
within the discretion of the Executive in how to manage the
budget of the federal government, there would be no
33
Constitutional violation.
This argument requires assuming that spending mandated
by federal law is only permitted but not required and that the
President could have the unilateral authority not to spend
money authorized by Congress. Unfortunately, the little law
there is on this subject contradicts this argument. First, the
Supreme Court has held that the President does not have, and
cannot have even with Congressional approval, the right to veto
34
individual items of spending in a larger spending bill.
Permitting the President to pick and choose among approved
items of spending effectively would grant the President a lineitem veto, thus making it unconstitutional. So this does not solve
the Constitutional problem.
Second, Congress itself could order the President to
35
prioritize certain spending over others without a statute. For
example, the President could ask Congress which spending
should be prioritized rather than make this decision unilaterally.
33. See, e.g., Kelleigh Irwin Fagan, Note, The Best Choice Out of Poor Options:
What the Government Should Do (Or Not Do) if Congress Fails to Raise the Debt Ceiling,
46 IND. L. REV. 205, 233–238 (2013).
34. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998). The dissent in Clinton
noted that it might be possible for Congress to enact discretionary expenditures without
running afoul of this doctrine. See id. at 466 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Even if this was the
law, which is not clear, it would not apply to mandatory spending such as Medicare or
interest on national debt.
35. See Full Faith and Credit Act, H.R. 807, 113th Cong. (2013),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-113hr807rh/pdf/BILLS-113hr807rh.pdf.
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Unfortunately this does not solve the problem either. The
Supreme Court has held that Congress cannot direct the
President through resolution as to how to execute the law, even
36
if it does so pursuant to duly enacted legislation permitting it. If
the President and Congress agreed which spending should be
prioritized over other spending, they could jointly pass a new
statute changing the prior spending, even retroactively. In such a
situation, however, there would not be a problem in the first
place. The problem only arises when Congress and the President
disagree. In fact, in the context of the debt ceiling, it is precisely
because Congress and the President cannot agree that the
conflict arose in the first place.
Taken together, this means that neither the President alone
nor Congress alone can resolve the Constitutional “trilemma”
37
(i.e., three unconstitutional choices) facing the President. Thus,
a violation of Section 3 of Article II of the Constitution.
2. Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
“[t]he validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized
by law . . . shall not be questioned.” Thus, some have argued that
38
the debt ceiling showdown itself violated Section 4.
The argument goes something along the following: (1)
Congress duly authorized public debt and other spending; (2)
once public debt is so authorized Congress cannot do anything
that threatens the debt being paid; (3) Congress has not
authorized enough revenue to pay the interest on the debt and
all the other authorized spending and has prohibited the
President form borrowing to do so; (4) taken together, Congress
has questioned the validity of the debt by making default
possible.
This is not as radical an idea as it first may seem. In fact, the
Supreme Court has held that
[t]he Fourteenth Amendment, in its fourth section, explicitly
declares: “The validity of the public debt of the United States,
authorized by law, . . . shall not be questioned,” [This is]
confirmatory of a fundamental principle which applies as well
to the government bonds [issued after], as to those issued
36. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
37. See Buchanan & Dorf supra note 31.
38. See Jacob D. Charles, Note, The Debt Limit and the Constitution: How the
Fourteenth Amendment Forbids Fiscal Obstructionism, 62 DUKE L.J. 1227 (2013).

1 - THE ARTICLE III FISCAL POWER_ROSENZWEIG (DO NOT DELETE)

138

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

3/17/2014 11:07 AM

[Vol. 29:127

before the amendment was adopted [and] the expression
“validity of the public debt” embrace[s] whatever concerns
39
the integrity of the public obligations.

Pursuant to this reasoning, the Court held that ordering
non-payment or payment not pursuant to the terms of the debt
was outside of the power of Congress. Thus, it seems clear that
Congress cannot directly enact a statute calling for the default or
40
disavowal of the public debt of the United States.
The question then becomes whether Congress may
indirectly do what it cannot do directly. In this case, Congress
clearly authorized public debt but did not authorize the means
for the President to satisfy the public debt. Commentators have
claimed that this itself in fact would violate Section 4 and thus is
41
unconstitutional.
Others have countered that failure to authorize sufficient
funds to engage both in statutory spending and servicing valid
public debt is not problematic because the President can simply
prioritize the public debt over other spending and avoid violating
Section 4. The argument on its face is appealing; Section 4
mandates servicing the public debt, the President has plenty of
money to do so, and if the President runs out of money afterwards
42
that does not violate any specific Constitutional provision.
There are two problems with such an argument, however.
First, it runs into the same Article II problem as discussed above.
If the President chooses to service the public debt at the expense
of paying military contractors (for example), the President has
still failed to execute the laws of the land. Even if this could be
overcome, for example by claiming that choosing the least
43
unconstitutional option still complies with Article II, such an
approach faces another potential issue: the impoundment problem.
In 1972, President Nixon invoked the inherent power of the
Presidency to impound, or refuse to spend, funds authorized by
Congress on certain environmental programs. Earlier that year,
President Nixon had vetoed the legislation authorizing such
funds but Congress overrode the veto. The issue made its way to
44
the Supreme Court, which held in Train v. City of New York
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 354 (1935).
See also Fagan, supra note 33.
See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 31.
See Fagan, supra note 33.
See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 31.
420 U.S. 35, 44–46 (1975).
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that the President could not use impoundment to avoid the
Constitutional override of his veto with respect to the authorized
funds. In other words, the President cannot do indirectly what
the President cannot do directly.
It is possible that Train is limited to the situation where
Congress overrode the veto of a President, and that absent such
an override the President retains the inherent power to impound
authorized funds. For example, President Jefferson claimed such
45
a power over two hundred years ago. Alternatively it is possible
that Train is limited to the situation where the President has the
legally authorized funds available and simply chooses not to
spend them. Either way, there is no doubt that the Supreme
Court believes that the issue is one subject to judicial review, and
any attempt by the President to impound funds necessary to
46
satisfy Section 4 would itself simply end up in court.
Further, in 1974 Congress enacted the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act, which forbade
Presidents from impounding funds absent approval by Congress
47
within 45 days. Presumably this would itself prevent the
President from unilaterally choosing to service the public debt
and default on other authorized spending without approval from
48
Congress. But, of course, if Congress could agree to this the
President would not be in the position in the first place. So it
would seem the Impoundment Act would present another
insurmountable hurdle to using impoundment to resolve the
Section 4 problem.
Taken together, it appears Section 4 presents an alternative
Constitutional violation sufficient to satisfy the first prong of
Jenkins.
B. FEDERAL COURTS HAVE POWER TO RESOLVE
The second step of Jenkins requires inquiring into whether
the federal courts even have the power to resolve the
Constitutional violation at hand. The Court has made clear that
45. See Roy E. Brownell II, The Constitutional Status of the President’s
Impoundment of National Security Funds, 12 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1, 30–33 (2001)
(“President Jefferson seems to have been the first President to have actually impounded
funds in a manner inconsistent with the will of Congress. In 1801, in his first message to
Congress, Jefferson announced that he was refusing to spend the money Congress had
appropriated for the construction of several navy yards”).
46. See id.
47. Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 602–692).
48. See also Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 31.
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the inability of a governmental entity to afford to pay for a
remedy is not a defense to the actual underlying Constitutional
49
violation. Thus, the issue of whether the courts are able to
provide a remedy cannot be limited to the question of whether
Congress has sufficient resources to pay for any such ordered
remedy. Rather, there are three steps necessary to such an
analysis: (1) does any plaintiff have standing to bring the claim,
(2) does the court have an available remedy within its powers,
and (3) is the issue justiciable (or conversely, is the issue subject
to the Political Question doctrine). As discussed in more detail
below, the answer to all three is yes.
1. Standing
The standing doctrine requires that a plaintiff with a real
and identifiable harm bring a case before the federal courts.
Standing is jurisdictional; absent standing the federal courts do
not have the power to hear a case. The standing doctrine is tied
to the Case or Controversy requirement of Article III, which
prevents federal courts from issuing advisory opinions.
At first glance, standing seems problematic for a Jenkins
type claim. Unlike in Jenkins where there were clearly students
being harmed (the students entitled to the additional spending
under the court order who were not receiving it), the issue is not
50
so clear in other cases. The Supreme Court has clearly held that
a taxpayer does not have standing to challenge a particular fiscal
policy of the United States simply in their capacity as a
51
taxpayer. Further, the Supreme Court has recently held that
even plaintiffs suffering specific harms do not have standing
52
under the Establishment Clause to challenge the failure to tax.
Thus, it also seems at first glance as if no taxpayer would have a
specific claim sufficient to establish standing under these
53
circumstances.

49. See Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
50. In actuality, KCMSD brought the initial lawsuit in Jenkins but eventually the
courts restructured the suit so that it was between students and parents, as the plaintiffs,
and KCMSD and Missouri, as the defendants.
51. See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., 551 U.S. 587 (2007).
52. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn (ACS), 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011). See
generally Linda Sugin, The Great and Mighty Tax Law: How the Roberts Court Has Reduced
Constitutional Scrutiny of Taxes and Tax Expenditures, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 777 (2013).
53. See Petrella v. Brownback, 2011 WL 884455 (D. Kan 2011) (holding that
taxpayers do not have standing to challenge a state cap on local jurisdiction taxing power
solely to require the locality to hold an election on the tax question).
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The standing problem turns out not to be as troubling as it
may initially appear, however. This harkens once again to the so54
called Gold Clause cases decided by the Supreme Court. As
noted above, in the Gold Clause cases Congress changed the
type of currency with which the President could satisfy the public
55
debts from gold-backed notes to non-gold-backed notes. The
Supreme Court held that this violated Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but that the remedy sought (payment
in gold-backed notes) was not available to the plaintiff.
Crucially, although not discussed, the Supreme Court must have
determined that the plaintiff in that case—a bondholder—had
standing to bring the challenge to the potential non-payment in
violation of Section 4. This must be the case, precisely because
standing is jurisdictional—the Supreme Court could not hear the
case at all if the plaintiff did not have standing.
But standing doctrine has developed considerably since the
Gold Clause cases. How does this affect the finding that the
plaintiffs in those cases must have had standing sufficient to
bring the claims in the first place? It turns out, most likely not at
all. Recent standing doctrine has focused on the presence of an
actual harm and whether a particular plaintiff has suffered that
particular harm. This was most starkly demonstrated in the
56
recent case of Hollingsworth v. Perry. In that case, opponents
of California’s Proposition 8, which defined marriage as only
between a man and a woman under the California Constitution,
brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the proposition
in federal court. They did so by suing the governor and attorney
general of the State of California. The district court ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs and found Proposition 8 unconstitutional.
The governor and attorney general declined to appeal the ruling.
Instead, a third party group supporting the proposition brought
the appeal. The Ninth Circuit heard the case, finding that the
appellants had standing after certifying the question to the
California Supreme Court, and upheld the decision of the district
57
court. But on certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the third
party group did not have proper standing to bring the appeal on
behalf of the state when the governor and attorney general
declined to do so.
54. See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 358 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294
U.S. 317, 329–30 (1935); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 316 (1935).
55. See Magliocca, supra note 10.
56. 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013).
57. Perry v. Brown, 671 F. 3d 1052, 1070–71 (2012).
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The Court in Hollingsworth held that being intensely
interested in an issue is not the same as bearing an injury in fact
58
sufficient for judicial redress. The Court made clear that the
reason for this standing doctrine was not to ensure that
sufficient damages could be awarded or that adverse parties
would bring out all the facts, but rather to ensure that courts
59
act as judges and not as legislators. In doing so, it reiterated
that the standing doctrine looks to the harm of the particular
party before the court and the ability of the court to redress the
harm, to wit:
Article III of the Constitution confines the judicial power of
federal courts to deciding actual “Cases” or “Controversies.”
§2. One essential aspect of this requirement is that any
person invoking the power of a federal court must
demonstrate standing to do so. This requires the litigant to
prove that he has suffered a concrete and particularized
injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and
is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560–561
(1992). In other words, for a federal court to have authority
under the Constitution to settle a dispute, the party before
it must seek a remedy for a personal and tangible harm.
“The presence of a disagreement, however sharp and
acrimonious it may be, is insufficient by itself to meet Art.
III’s requirements.” [Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62
60
(1986)].

Under this standard, bondholders would face the risk of
nonpayment by the government on government issued bonds,
and a judgment ordering payment would fully redress this
injury. So it seems clear that bondholders would have
standing to bring a claim that a statute violates Section 4 of
61
the Fourteenth Amendment. Contrast this with interest
groups wanting to issue more public debt to fund authorized
unemployment insurance benefits. In that case, while the
58. “For there to be such a case or controversy, it is not enough that the party
invoking the power of the court have a keen interest in the issue. That party must also
have ‘standing,’ which requires, among other things, that it have suffered a concrete and
particularized injury.” 133 S. Ct at 2659.
59. Id. (“This is an essential limit on our power: It ensures that we act as judges,
and do not engage in policymaking properly left to elected representatives.”) (emphasis
not included).
60. Id. at 2661.
61. See John McGuire, Comment, The Public Debt Clause and the Social Security
Trust Funds: Enforcement Mechanism or Historical Peculiarity?, 7 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L.
203 (2006). See also Fagan, supra note 33.
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interest group would clearly be interested, under the
reasoning of Hollingsworth (which invokes the reasoning of a
62
long line of standing precedent ), the interest group would not
have standing for purposes of Article III.
But that bondholders may have standing does not alone
necessarily mean that bondholders would bring suit. Rather, it
would seem investors who hold U.S. Treasury bonds as an
investment could simply sell the bonds if they were concerned
about repayment. This would lead to a drop in price, but more
importantly the new purchasers would have priced this risk into
the bond and thus presumably would have little incentive to
bring a lawsuit either.
But that too is also not the end of the story, since the largest
holder of Treasury debt is not the public or foreign governments,
but rather the Social Security Trust Fund. The problem is that
the bulk of the debt held by the Social Security Trust Fund is not
in fact federal Treasury bonds but rather a special type of debt
only available to the Fund that is privileged over public debt.
With respect to this special debt, the Fund has a right to be paid
by statute, but the statute explicitly permits this obligation to be
abrogated by statute as well. Thus, even if the Trust Fund
wanted to sue for payment, doing so would not implicate the
same types of Constitutional claims that a lawsuit brought by
63
ordinary public debt holders would. This is not the end of the
analysis, however. In addition to the special Trust Fund debt
certificates, the Fund also owns regular public debt, payment on
which could potentially be threatened by a debt ceiling
64
standoff. There is no reason to believe that solely because the
Fund holds both types of debt that its injury in fact and redress
of the federal courts would be any less with respect to its
ordinary Treasury debt than any other holder of Treasury debt.
Thus, taken together, presumably the Trustees of the Fund
could bring a Gold Clause type of claim as plaintiff on the basis that
failure to pay the bonds would violate their duty to maintain the

62. Hollingsworth cites, among others, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560–561 (1992); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
754 (1984); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
63. See McGuire, supra note 61.
64. See Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, et al., Judicial Compulsion and the Public Fisc – A
Historical Overview, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 525 (2012) (distinguishing standing
claims between those with only general claims on government benefits and government
bondholders during periods of austerity).
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solvency of the Fund.65 Under the modern standing doctrine, as
66
reflected in Hollingsworth, this would resolve the standing issue.
Similarly, since even a potential default could result in an
immediate and current loss in value to the bonds held by the
Fund needed to service Social Security obligations, the Fund
would suffer an actual harm prior to actual default and thus
under this analysis could well bring a claim before an actual
default. Further, if the Fund could establish likelihood of success
on the merits, it would seem that the potential irrevocable loss of
billions of dollars of value in the Fund’s primary asset (for
example, if the markets permanently downgraded U.S. debt)
would be precisely the type of situation in which courts should
be willing to issue immediate temporary relief pending
67
resolution of the trial.
2. Remedy
While the Gold Clause cases and the more recent line of
cases provide an avenue for standing, at least for the Social
Security Trust Fund, they present another obstacle: that of
remedy. The Court held in the Gold Clause cases that the
plaintiff had standing and that Congress had violated Section 4
of the Fourteenth Amendment, but that the Court had no
remedy to provide to the plaintiff. This was because the Court
could not order Congress to print gold-backed dollars to pay off
the bond, and no other remedy would make the plaintiff whole.
At first glance this seems prohibitive to finding a remedy in a
Jenkins-type case between Congress and the President. Looked at
65. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Balanced Budget Amendment and Social
Security: An Alternative Means of Judicial Enforcement, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 513,
523–24 (1998) (analyzing standing of Social Security Fund trustees to enforce a
hypothetical Balanced Budget Amendment).
66. There should also be no sovereign immunity concern under the Gold Clause
cases and other precedent, as well as statutory considerations, as well. See Fagan supra
note 33; McGuire, supra note 61; Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets,
Fourteenth Amendment Style, 33 TULSA L.J. 561, 606–08 (1998).
67. See Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Renewed: Preliminary Injunctions to Secure
Potential Money Judgments, 67 WASH. L. REV. 257, 286 (1992) (“[i]f . . . the most
compelling reason in favor of entering a preliminary injunction is the need to prevent the
judicial process from being rendered futile by defendant’s action or refusal to act . . . then
the case in favor of preliminary injunctions to enjoin the dissipation of assets is
compelling indeed.”) (internal citations omitted). See also Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d
1067 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding the Supreme Court’s restriction on issuing preliminary
injunctions in debt cases does not apply to suits seeking equitable relief); Bethany M.
Bates, Note, Reconciliation After Winter: The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 111
COLUM. L. REV. 1522 (2011).
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more closely, however, the differences become apparent. In the
Gold Clause cases the Court held that it could not order Congress
to issue a specific type of currency and only that specific type of
currency would suffice to redress the harm at issue. By contrast, in
most cases the issue will not be what type of currency but how
much currency is necessary to satisfy the Constitution. Thus, in
situations where the question comes down to how much money is
at issue rather than the type of money at issue the conclusion on
remedy of the Gold Clause cases proves inapt.
This distinction can be seen in the history of the Jenkins case
itself. In Jenkins the district court ordered that a property tax and
an income tax be imposed to fund the necessary capital
68
improvements. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the order with
respect to the property tax but reversed on the income tax on the
theory that district courts cannot impose a tax unless there is no
69
other alternative. This theory is based on the case of Lidell v.
70
Missouri, an Eighth Circuit case which explicitly recognized the
power of district courts to impose taxes directly when there are no
less intrusive means of remedying the Constitutional violation.
What to make of Lidell as applied in Jenkins? A brief
review of the background leading up to Jenkins may prove
helpful. First, the Supreme Court held in Griffin v. County
71
School Board that district courts have the power to enjoin the
payment of scholarships and grants if the effect was to violate
Brown, a traditional negative remedy. Next, the Supreme
Court held in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of
72
Education (Swann II) that district courts had the power to
order specific actions to remedy a Constitutional violation if
the defendant refused to do so. This was the introduction of the
affirmative remedy. Following that, the Supreme Court held in
73
Milliken v. Bradley that any remedies adopted by the district
court needed to be narrowly tailored to remedy the underlying
Constitutional violation and were limited by the constraints of
comity (in the case of state and local school districts).
Separately, in cases not related to school desegregation, the
Supreme Court has been inconsistent in what level of fiscal
authority a federal court may have to remedy a Constitutional
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F.Supp. 400 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988).
731 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1984).
377 U.S. 218 (1964).
402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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violation. Thus, the Supreme Court has held in a string of cases
that when a locality issues bonds a State may not subsequently
pass a law prohibiting the locality from imposing taxes to repay
74
the bond. These cases stood primarily for the proposition that
States could not undermine the validity of a debt issued by a
locality by removing the locality’s taxing power under the
Contracts Clause of the Constitution. Crucially, however, the
Supreme Court assumed that the locality had the appropriate
power to tax at the time the bonds were issued. Thus, the
negative remedy of striking down the prohibition was sufficient
to satisfy the debts. In a separate line of cases, however, the
Supreme Court held that federal courts could not affirmatively
grant the power to tax to localities for which the State had never
75
granted that power in the first place.
So Jenkins arose within the context of these disparate lines
of cases. District courts clearly had the power to forbid
discriminatory spending but did not have the power to order
taxes by localities for which they never had the authority. The
Court in Jenkins applied this line, holding that the district court
had properly ordered the imposition of a property tax to fund
the desegregation order—a power KCMSD had prior to its
being revoked by Missouri—but inappropriately ordered the
imposition of an income tax—a power that it was unclear
whether KCMSD had and clearly had not been exercised by
KCMSD in the past.
Where does this leave the Court with regard to a remedy for
a Constitutional violation undertaken by the coordinate federal
branches? At a minimum, it is clear that the federal courts would
have the power to strike down the debt ceiling statute if the
statute itself violated the Constitution. Striking down the debt
ceiling is different than authorizing new debt, however, which
authorization would be required to permit the President to issue
new debt to satisfy statutory spending obligations. In fact,
technically the debt ceiling is an authorization to issue federal
76
debt, up to a certain level, and not really a ceiling at all.
This leaves the federal courts looking to more affirmative
remedies. For example, it is clear that the courts could order the
74. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Hubert v. Mayor of New Orleans, 215 U.S. 170 (1909)
(striking down statute preventing repayment of bonds); Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248
(1906) (striking down statute revoking locality’s charter to prevent repayment of bonds).
75. See, e.g., Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472 (1880); United States v. County of
Macon, 99 U.S. 582 (1878).
76. But see Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 31.
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President to undertake spending to avoid a Constitutional
violation. Per Jenkins, therefore, it would seem that the courts
should equally have the power to order such spending and to
authorize a means to engage in the spending which would be
available absent the legislative prohibition against such
spending. In other words, the Court could order the President to
issue debt or collect taxes sufficient to engage in the spending
necessary to avoid the Constitutional violation. Following the
limitations in Jenkins, presumably this would mean ordering the
issuance of new federal debt rather than ordering a new tax
increase since issuing debt is the typical way the President
undertakes spending not covered by tax revenue.
Taken together, then, the Court has the power to order the
President to issue new debt in excess of the debt ceiling to avoid
a Constitutional violation. But what if the President does not
want to do so or cannot do so in a timely manner? Would the
remedies rejected by the Court in Jenkins now become
available?
The Court in Jenkins held that the federal courts had the
power to order the imposition of taxes directly on residents of
KCMSD but that it should not have done so on the basis of
comity. Comity is a doctrine that emerges from the federalist
structure of the Constitution claiming that federal courts must
respect the sovereignty of the states within the purview of their
77
jurisdiction. Based on the doctrine of comity, the Supreme
Court held that directly imposing taxes would violate the
78
sovereignty of Missouri and was thus inappropriate. Since there
was a remedy available that did not violate comity, this lesser
79
remedy was upheld by the Court.
But a comity doctrine meant to respect the sovereignty of
the states does not, and cannot, apply to the federal government.
So how should the ruling in Jenkins be interpreted in light of
this? One possible reading would be that the Court held that
direct taxing power is outside of the scope of the power of the
federal courts under Article III. While this may have intuitive
appeal, the logic of Jenkins does not seem to support it. Article
III is jurisdictional. If something is outside the scope of Article
77. See, e.g., James C. Rehnquist, Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the
Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (1994).
78. See Jenkins, supra note 4.
79. But see Douglas J. Brocker, Note, Taxation Without Representation: The
Judicial Usurpation of the Power to Tax in Missouri v. Jenkins, 69 N.C. L. REV. 741
(1990).
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III, the courts cannot engage in that activity regardless of any
other limitations on the power of the courts.
In other words, the Supreme Court would not have needed
to resort to comity—a non-jurisdictional rule—unless the courts
theoretically had jurisdiction over the case, and thus implicitly
the power to impose taxes directly under Article III in the first
80
place. Consequently, rather than reading Jenkins as a
narrowing of the inherent power of the federal courts, Jenkins
recognized a vast and significant increase in the power of the
courts, albeit subject to other limiting doctrines such as comity.
Taking this as true, could any other doctrine apply to limit
the ability of the federal courts to impose taxes or issue federal
debt directly? The most obvious one on its face is the doctrine of
separation of powers. Under the doctrine of separation of
powers, a power delegated to one branch of the federal
government cannot be exercised by another branch of the
federal government. The policy behind this is to prevent any one
branch from obtaining the ability to act unilaterally so as to
minimize the potential abuse of power in the government.
For example, as discussed above, the Supreme Court has
held that the so-called Line-Item Veto was unconstitutional
81
under the separation of powers doctrine. In that case, Congress
had passed a law granting the power to the President to strike
down specific items of spending in an appropriation bill while
signing the larger bill itself. This would permit Congress to pass
large appropriations bills with so-called “pork barrel” or “log
rolling” items to garner the votes necessary to pass, but the
President could sign the bill into law while doing away with these
82
wasteful expenditures. The Court held that such a system
violated the separation of powers in that it granted the
President a quasi-legislative power reserved for Congress under
83
the Constitution.
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants the power
to impose Taxes, Imposts, Duties and Tariffs to Congress.
80. See, e.g,, Peter D. Enrich, Federal Courts and State Taxes: Some Jurisdictional
Issues, with Special Attention to the Tax Injunction Act, 65 TAX LAW. 731 (2012).
81. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
82. See, e.g., Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules:
Entrenchment, Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL.
345 (2003).
83. For support, the Court also noted that the Act could violate the Presentment
Clause, which requires the President to sign or veto any bill presented to the President by
Congress. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 421.
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This would seem to make clear that only Congress may
impose any such taxes, meaning that under the doctrine of
separation of powers no other branch could do so. But, as
usual, the issue is more complicated than it would appear at
first glance.
At a minimum, it seems clear that a majority of the Court
has never held that the federal courts are forbidden from
engaging in remedies of Constitutional violations solely because
the remedy would involve entering an area traditionally reserved
84
for another branch. In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized
a number of situations in which the federal courts can exercise
powers that look surprisingly similar to legislative or executive
powers, notwithstanding that those are clearly delegated to other
85
branches. For example, the Supreme Court has upheld the
power of the federal courts to impose their own Congressional
86
districts and to decide how to manage and operate prisons,
including which to close, what staff to hire, and how to fund
87
them. This point was made explicit by the Supreme Court in
Brown v. Plata, which stated “Courts nevertheless must not
shrink from their obligation to enforce the constitutional rights
of all persons . . . Courts may not allow constitutional violations
to continue simply because a remedy would involve intrusion
88
into the realm of prison administration.” In a different context,
the Supreme Court has actually said that the federal courts
89
taking on the “essentially legislative task” of crafting a remedy
to a Constitutional violation is crucial to the bedrock of the
90
separation of powers doctrine.
Taken together, according to at least one recent article, “[i]t
may, in fact, be fair to say that the role of the constitutional
judge as policymaker and potential administrator of public
institutions has now become a permanent feature of American
84. Cf. Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1953 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Structural injunctions . . . [turn] judges into long-term administrators of complex social
institutions such as schools, prisons, and police departments. Indeed, they require judges
to play a role essentially indistinguishable from the role ordinarily played by executive
officials. Today’s decision not only affirms the structural injunction but vastly expands its
use, by holding that an entire system is unconstitutional because it may produce
constitutional violations.”).
85. See Ridgway, supra note 28 at 103–11.
86. See Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254 (2003).
87. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
88. Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 1928–29.
89. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 28 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
90. Cf. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 69 (2001) (affirming the
availability of a Bivens claim if no alternative legislative remedy exists).
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constitutional law.” 91 Thus, the question is not whether federal
courts may encroach on essentially legislative functions, but
rather whether doing so in a particular case is entrusted to the
federal courts pursuant to the Article III mandate that the
92
judicial power be exercised by the federal courts.
So, is remedying the failure to make Constitutionally
mandated payments within the judicial power? Given the
history of the Gold Clause cases and the Jenkins cases,
especially in light of recent exercises of judicial power in cases
such as Brown v. Plata, it would seem the answer to this
question is clearly yes. If anything, the concerns expressed in
most cases about doing so tend to involve respect for the
93
sovereignty of the states in their traditional realms, which
does not apply as between Congress and the President. Thus,
the question comes down to whether the Court should choose
to exercise that power in the politically fraught situation of a
Constitutional showdown between Congress and the President
94
leading to such a Constitutional violation. The next section
will consider that question.
3. The Political Question Doctrine
In general, the Court has held that it should not exercise
even its proper jurisdiction over an issue that is a question better
suited to the political process. This has led to the development of
the so-called “political question” doctrine. The political question
doctrine has proven both somewhat elusive and remarkably
resilient. At times, the doctrine has been described as a form of
extension of the standing doctrine, that is, that the federal courts
should choose not to exercise jurisdiction when doing so would
implicate similar concerns as those raised under the standing

91. Laurence P. Claus & Richard S. Kay, Constitutional Courts as “Positive
Legislators” in the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 479, 504 (2010).
92. See Yoo, supra note 27.
93. See Brown, 131 S.Ct. at 1946-47 (“Proper respect for the State and for its
governmental processes require that the three-judge court exercise its jurisdiction to
accord the State considerable latitude to find mechanisms and make plans to correct the
violations in a prompt and effective way consistent with public safety . . . . At the same
time, both the three-judge court and state officials must bear in mind the need for a
timely and efficacious remedy for the ongoing violation of prisoners’ constitutional
rights”).
94. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA.
L. REV. 991 (2008).
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doctrine. 95 At other times, the political question doctrine has
been described as a separate doctrine, unrelated to standing,
providing a pragmatic way for the courts to avoid conflicts with
the political branches over cases that might raise justiciable
96
issues but over which the courts should not interfere.
Rather than take a position in this debate, this Section will
apply the classic political question doctrine, as interpreted by
97
scholars, as a doctrinal matter. To begin, the classic statement
of the political question doctrine can be found in the case Baker
98
v. Carr as follows:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly
according to the settings in which the questions arise may
describe a political question, although each has one or more
elements which identify it as essentially a function of the
separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case
held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
99
pronouncements by various departments on one question.

To this end, the court in Baker held that a challenge to state
voting laws as violating the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment was not a nonjusticiable political
question. Crucially, the Court stated expressly, “the mere fact
that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it

95. See Heather Elliot, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459 (2008)
(providing a summary and overview of the differing theories behind standing as
compared to political question doctrine).
96. See id.
97. See, e.g., Jesse H Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54
DUKE L. J. 1457 (2005); Oona Hathaway, et. al., The Treaty Power: Its History, Scope,
and Limits, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 239 (2013); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan,
Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA L.
REV. 541 (2004).
98. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
99. Id. at 217.
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presents a political question. Such an objection is little more
100
than a play upon words.”
Similarly, the mere fact that a suit challenging nonpayment
of a bond implicates a political showdown does not mean that
the issue is a nonjusticiable political question; in fact, according
to the command of Baker that should be irrelevant to the
101
question. Rather, any analysis should focus on the factors
delineated by the Court in Baker instead.
To this end, recent scholarship has strenuously argued that
the treaty power is not a political question under this rubric,
notwithstanding that the decision to enter into a treaty is a
deeply political one clearly committed to the political
102
branches. Hathaway, et al., apply a Baker taxonomy to
103
determine whether the treaty power is a political question.
This Essay will apply the same taxonomy.
Pursuant to this taxonomy, the first factor does not apply
104
because it rarely applies. Per the article, “[t]he fact that these
powers are entrusted to other branches does not mean that
oversight of their lawful exercise is outside the responsibility of
105
the judiciary.” Rather, the issue is whether the power has been
expressly or impliedly committed to the political branches.
Given the history of the Gold Clause cases, Jenkins v. Missouri,
and even more recent cases such as Busse v. City of Golden, it
would be difficult to contend that such issues are unambiguously
committed to the political branches. Thus, factor one would not
preclude review of the issue.
Under the taxonomy, the second and third factors question
whether judicial criteria, as opposed to purely political criteria,
106
are available to resolve the question at issue. This tends to
come down to the question of whether fixed, clear, and
articulable standards can be used to determine the outcome of
the case. Again, given the history of the court in addressing
issues relating to the issuance of federal bonds and the need for
inherent remedial powers, there is no reason to doubt that the
100. Id. at 209 (internal quotations omitted).
101. Cf. Busse v. City of Golden, 73 P.3d 660, 664 (Colo. 2003) (holding that
question of whether city spent bond proceeds on inappropriate expenditures is not a
political question under the Colorado constitution, citing Baker v. Carr).
102. See Oona Hathaway et al., supra note 97.
103. See id. at 280–85.
104. Id. at 280.
105. Id. at 281.
106. Id.
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issue of whether the federal government has violated the
Constitution in failing to authorize sufficient revenue to pay its
debts is justiciable, especially since the Court has already done
so in the past.
For example, a single bondholder may have a single
payment of a fixed amount due on a fixed date. If the federal
government cannot pay on the fixed due date and defaults, the
question of nonpayment clearly seems subject to justiciable
standards, i.e., whether the government failed to make a fixed
payment on a fixed due date. As these are clear and specific
legal and factual questions, if anything these factors would seem
to weigh strongly in favor of judicial review.
Per the taxonomy, “[t]he fourth, fifth, and sixth prongs of
the Baker test all address the prudential consideration that there
are times when it is imperative for the government to speak with
107
one voice.” It is under this rubric that the need for judicial
action in fact becomes most stark. In fact, as opposed to the
scenario in which which the political branches have spoken with
a unitary voice, in the circumstances described in this Essay the
political branches have failed to work at all. To wit: both
Congress and the President authorized duly issued federal debt
and annual spending plans, both Congress and the President
authorized the tax law that generated insufficient funds to meet
these obligations, and both Congress and the President enacted a
debt ceiling (and failed to raise it) preventing the President from
borrowing to meet this shortfall. While this may present a
108
Constitutional Crisis, it is precisely the opposite situation
envisioned by Baker in establishing the prudential
considerations underlying the political question doctrine.
Taken together, if anything the Baker factors would seem to
lean in favor of judicial resolution of this issue rather than
nonjusticiabilty as a political question. This may strike some as
odd, or perhaps even discomforting. After all, what could be
more inherently political than a political showdown between the
two democratically elected branches of government over fiscal
policy? This is true, to an extent. If the matter was one of first
impression, i.e., it was a political debate over whether to engage
in a new spending program, such an argument could well be
persuasive. But this is not such a case. The political branches
have painted themselves into a proverbial corner. By issuing
107.
108.

Id. at 282.
See Levinson and Balkin, supra note 1.
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debt and authorizing spending, the political branches implicated
Constitutional protections they need not have. But once
implicated, the fact that a political fight leads to the violation of
these protections does not cloak the Constitutional violation in
109
the protection of the political question doctrine.
This ultimately may be the true lesson of Jenkins v.
Missouri, at least as seen through the lens of Baker v. Carr. In
Jenkins the Court held that if the KCMSD had never had the
power to impose taxes the remedy adopted by the district court
might well have been inappropriate. But once granted, the
power to raise property taxes cannot be rescinded solely as a
means to violate Constitutional protections, and federal courts
must have the inherent remedial authority to address such
violations. If this was true in Jenkins, it would seem only more
true in a dispute among the coordinate federal branches.
C. ATTEMPT TO UNDERMINE THE CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY
At this point, undertake a thought experiment. Assume
the President has been authorized to issue sufficient to debt to
meet the country’s obligations. The President then attempts to
issue debt to raise money to pay off debts owed to the Social
Security Trust Fund. Congress then passes a new statute (say,
by overriding a veto) forbidding the President from issuing
debt to satisfy debt obligations to the trust fund (for example,
as an indirect way to try to force Social Security reform). The
Supreme Court ultimately hears the case and strikes down the
statute as unconstitutional. By striking down the statute, the
debt issued once again proves valid under the President’s initial
authorization and the President may settle the obligations to
the trust fund.
What if, instead, Congress initially adopts a law that both
mandates payment of the Social Security Trust Fund debt
obligations and also forbids the issuance of new debt obligations
at the same time? At this point, striking down the statute is not
sufficient. The President would still be under the obligation to
settle the trust fund obligations but would not be authorized to
issue the debt even if the provision forbidding new debt was
struck down. This is because, at least under current law, the
109. A similar argument was cited by the district court in the challenge against
California’s Proposition 8, i.e., that granting and then removing a privilege invokes
different Constitutional considerations than never granting it in the first place. See Perry
v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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President must have affirmative authority to issue U.S. debt in
order to do so.
What would be the result in such a case? The answer is a
roadmap to the political branches to avoid judicial oversight of
potentially unconstitutional behavior simply by choosing option
2 instead of option 1. The issue, then, is whether Congress or the
President can, by choosing one procedural approach over
another, effectively remove the power of the federal courts to
hear and resolve Constitutional questions.
This thought experiment is simply a federal version of what
occurred in Jenkins. KCMSD had the authority to raise property
taxes to comply with the district court’s desegregation order, and
in fact attempted to do so. The State of Missouri acted to
remove this taxing power from KCMSD, causing KCMSD to be
in default of the order. Merely striking down the Missouri
statute as unconstitutional, however, might not be sufficient
without also enacting a new state law authorizing KCMSD to
raise taxes or issue new debt. Rather, the district court ordered
the taxes directly to fund the desegregation order. The Supreme
Court agreed with the remedial power of the district court but
found the facts looked more like the first situation than the
second, and ordered the district court to give KCMSD the
option to raise taxes before doing so directly.
Thus, the issue in Jenkins was not whether the district court
had the power to impose taxes to comply with the desegregation
order, but rather a factual question, informed by principles of
comity, as to whether KCMSD had the authority to do so simply
as a result of the district court striking down the Missouri cap on
KCMSD’s taxing power.
In the federal context, however, this is not the case. The socalled “debt ceiling” is itself a creature of the statute authorizing
110
the issuance of federal debt. This, in turn, raises the so-called
severability doctrine. In other words, would striking down the
debt ceiling also strike down the statute authorizing the issuance
of federal debt in the first place?
The severability doctrine recently received an extensive
111
review by the Supreme Court in the case of NFIB v. Sebelius.
In that case, the Court was considering the Constitutionality of
the Affordable Care Act, also known as ObamaCare. One of the
110.
111.

31 U.S.C. §§3101–3111 (2011).
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)
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key questions at issue was the Constitutionality of the so-called
individual mandate to purchase health insurance. While there
was significant disparity over that question, a second question
proved almost as crucial: if the mandate was unconstitutional,
would that invalidate the entire statute or just the mandate?
Four justices found the entire Act Constitutional under the
112
Commerce Clause power and thus did not address this issue.
One justice found the individual mandate unconstitutional under
the Commerce Clause but Constitutional under the Taxing
113
Power and thus did not address the issue. Four justices,
however, found the mandate unconstitutional and found that it
114
was not severable and thus invalidated the entire act. While
not a majority, there were some indications that the lone justice
might have agreed with the severability analysis of this group, in
which case it would have garnered a majority.
Under this analysis of severability, the question is whether a
provision can be struck down in such a way that the core purpose
of the entire statute is not undermined. In other words, if the
unconstitutional portion of a statute is crucial to the working of
the statute as a whole, the entire statute must fall as
115
unconstitutional as well. Pursuant to this reasoning, the four
justice opinion in Sebelius held that the entire Affordable Care
Act must fall if the individual mandate was unconstitutional.
Assuming this analysis is correct, there is no doubt that the
debt ceiling provision is core to the debt authorization statute
as a whole. The entire point of enacting a limit on the
authorization to issue debt on behalf of the United States is to
prevent an executive from having unlimited discretion in
funding the government with debt as opposed to other sources
of funding. If true, there is no way to sever the ability to issue
debt with the limit on the amount of debt that can be issued.
Thus, if the debt limit is unconstitutional, so must be the debt
116
authorization as well.
If correct, the Supreme Court finds itself in an impossible
situation. If it finds the failure to raise taxes or issue debt
violates the Constitution, it may strike down the debt limit as
112. Id. at 2609.
113. Id. at 2600.
114. Id. at 2668-70.
115. Id. at 2668.
116. Id. at 2669 (“the Court must determine if Congress would have enacted [the
provisions] standing alone and without the unconstitutional portion. If Congress would
not, those provisions, too, must be invalidated”).
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unconstitutional, but doing so would effectively prevent the
President from issuing new debt, thereby only exacerbating the
Constitutional violation. Unlike in Jenkins, there is no lesser
remedy available to the Court, whether under principles of
comity or separation of powers, to remedy the Constitutional
violation. Thus, the Court would have to resort to its inherent
remedial powers to do so.
This is not to say that the severability analysis is clear or
obvious, or even that all reasonable people would necessarily
agree. For example, Buchanan and Dorf have analyzed the debt
ceiling statute and concluded that the ceiling, 26 U.S.C. § 3101,
can be unconstitutional independent of the authorization to
117
borrow, 26 U.S.C. § 3102. Buchanan and Dorf point to a
number of factors, including that they are separately codified,
that they have been amended separately, and that the
118
authorization can act independently of the limit.
This is true, insofar as it goes. Buchanan and Dorf
undertake this analysis in an attempt to establish that the
President has the authority to disregard the debt limit in certain
119
circumstances. But they concede it is not entirely clear how a
court would deal with the same question in a case properly
120
before it, citing precisely the four justice opinion in Sebelius.
Thus, the question is not whether the debt ceiling statute could
properly be severed from the debt authorization statute but
whether the Court could, in adopting a remedial measure to
enforce a Constitutional violation, strike down the debt ceiling in
such a way that would authorize the President to borrow against
the will of Congress.
As Buchanan and Dorf appear to concede, authorizing the
President to issue debt in contravention of the debt ceiling would
itself be unconstitutional, albeit in their opinion the least
121
unconstitutional option. To the extent this is true, this Essay is
122
in complete agreement. The issue is not whether the choices
faced by the President are unconstitutional, but whether the
117. See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Debt
Ceiling: When Negotiating Over Spending and Tax Laws, Congress and the President
Should Consider the Debt Ceiling a Dead Letter, 113 COLUM. L. REV. Sidebar 32, 38
(March 5, 2013).
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id. (“there may be some doubt about whether the courts will presume that
sub-parts of a single statute are severable”).
121. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 31.
122. See supra p. 136.
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Court, in the face of this unconstitutional choice, may (or
potentially must) use its inherent remedial power to fashion a
Constitutional remedy when Congress attempts to preclude it
from doing so. Under the doctrine of Missouri v. Jenkins, the
answer is yes.
In many ways, this is reminiscent of other disputes between
Congress and the Court over the proper jurisdiction of the Court
in potentially politically sensitive questions. While there is no
recent case law involving such politically contentious issues in
the fiscal arena, there have been cases in other areas that might
help shed light on the issue. Perhaps most famously this occurred
123
in the cases of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld and Boumediene v.
124
Bush —the Guantanamo Bay cases. In those cases, Congress
attempted to forbid the federal courts from hearing challenges to
detention by prisoners in Guantanamo Bay by stripping the
courts of jurisdiction over such claims. The problem was that
there were potential Constitutional violations occurring as a
result (in this case, the suspension of habeas corpus). The issue
came down to whether Congress could, pursuant to its clear
Constitutional authority to establish the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, strip the courts of jurisdiction in one politically
sensitive area. The Court held it could not, finding that at some
point a federal court must have access to hear such a case to
enforce the Constitutional protections afforded such prisoners,
125
striking down the statute as unconstitutional. If not, the
Court held, Congress could effectively abrogate these
126
protections from the Constitution. In other words, Congress
could not attempt to avoid the Constitutional issue simply by
enacting a law purportedly taking away some of the inherent
127
“judicial power” of the Court.
While the Guantanamo Bay cases literally dealt with issues
of life and death and legal considerations as important as the
123. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
124. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
125. See Alex Glashausser, The Extension Clause and the Supreme Court’s
Jurisdictional Independence, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1225 (2012).
126. See Martin J. Katz, Guantanamo, Boumediene, and Jurisdiction-Stripping: The
Imperial President Meets the Imperial Court, 25 CONST. COMMENT. 377 (2009).
127. See Glashausser, supra note 125 at 1302 (“As is widely recognized, the drafters
of the Constitution envisioned an independent judiciary that could operate without fear
of legislative reprisal. What is often overlooked is that the judiciary necessarily consists
of not only the judges themselves but also the abstract judicial power—including
jurisdiction—that they wield. Together, Sections 1 and 2 of Article III declare for the
Supreme Court a robust jurisprudential and jurisdictional independence.”).
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writ of habeas corpus, perhaps some lessons could be drawn out
of these cases to the fiscal arena. At its core, the Court held that
the political branches could not completely abrogate specific and
enforceable Constitutional protections solely by limiting the
jurisdiction of the courts. Similarly, permitting Congress to avoid
any review to enforce the Constitutional protections afforded
bondholders of the United States would be an attempt by one
branch to interfere in the operations of another.
Just as the Supreme Court held that Congress could not do
so in the case of Guantanamo Bay prisoners, it follows that
128
Congress could not do so in the case of bondholders. The only
way to argue to the contrary would be to somehow contend that
the Constitutional protections afforded by Section 4 of the
Fourteenth Amendment or other similar provisions are entitled
to less judicial protection than those embodying the right to
habeas corpus or other criminal procedural rights. It is difficult
to think of a way to differentiate between the relative costs and
benefits of explicit Constitutional protections based solely on
their subject matter without placing the courts in the position of
picking and choosing which provisions they like and which they
do not. Since this runs directly contrary to the judicial power, at
least as described by the Supreme Court, this would be a difficult
argument to make. Accordingly, under this line of reasoning, the
third prong of the Jenkins analysis would be satisfied as well.
D. TAXING AND BORROWING AS AN
INHERENT REMEDIAL POWER
Assuming the foregoing is correct, the Jenkins test establishes
that the Court must utilize its inherent remedial authority to craft
a remedy to the case before it. To this end, the Court seems faced
with only two choices: (1) raise money through imposing taxes, or
(2) raise money through issuing federal debt. The immediate
question that must be addressed, however, is, why not simply
order the President to do one of these?
The answer derives, in part, from the seminal case of
129
Marbury v. Madison. In Marbury, the Supreme Court held that
Marbury was entitled to a judicial commission, that failure to
deliver the commission violated Marbury’s rights, and that a writ
of mandamus to compel the President to deliver the commission
was the appropriate remedy. However, the Court declined to
128.
129.

See id.
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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enter an order requiring the President to deliver the commission
to Marbury on the theory that to do so would violate the
Constitution. More specifically, the Court held that the statute
granting jurisdiction to the Supreme Court to issue the writ itself
violated the Constitution.
For first-year law students, the take-away of Marbury is that
the Supreme Court has the power of judicial review, that is, to
declare that a statute of Congress violates the Constitution and
therefore is null and void. A second take-away often cited of
130
Marbury is that every legal violation is entitled to a remedy.
The first is obviously correct, at least insofar as Marbury in fact
held a statute unconstitutional. The second has proven more
131
difficult to apply in the real world.
For purposes of this Essay, therefore, the ultimate take-away
of Marbury is the proposition that the ultimate job of the federal
courts is to adjudicate cases properly before them and to craft
132
appropriate remedies for those cases. In Marbury the case was
not properly before the Supreme Court. But in this situation,
having undergone the first three steps of the Jenkins analysis, the
case is properly before the federal courts. Thus, once having
decided that the provision at issue violates the Constitution, the
Jenkins test, consistent with Swann and Milliken, not only permits
but requires the Court to fashion an appropriate remedy. If not,
the Article III command that the judicial power be vested in the
133
federal courts would prove illusory.
In some ways, this bears a remarkable resemblance to other
areas of law where the courts have invoked their inherent
powers to mandate spending. For example, courts have the
inherent power to impose and collect fines from people held in

130. Id. at 163.
131. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 338 (1993) (“Marbury’s
promise of a remedy for every rights violation is better viewed as a flexible normative
principle than as an unbending rule of constitutional law. Nevertheless, the Constitution
in general and the Due Process Clause in particular do sometimes require individually
effective remediation for constitutional violations.”); see also Derek Ludwin, Note, Can
Courts Confer Citizenship? Plenary Power and Equal Protection, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1376
(1999) (describing Miller v. Albright in which the Supreme Court held it could not
provide a remedy for an unconstitutional naturalization statute).
132. See Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to be Done: An Essay
on Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the
Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253 (2003).
133. Joseph J. Anclien, Broader is Better: The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts, 64
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 37 (2008).
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contempt. 134 But nothing in Article III of the Constitution,
which vests the judicial power of the United States in the
Supreme Court and the other federal courts created by
Congress, says anything about a contempt power or a power to
impose and collect fines. Yet it is well accepted that such a
power must exist or else the courts would not be able to fully
135
exercise the judicial power.
Similarly, courts have held that they may order spending by
the government absent Congressional authorization in the
interests of justice. For example, in the case of Jacksonville Port
136
Authority v. Adams the plaintiffs sued the FAA for failing to
distribute appropriated funds to them as required by the
authorizing statute. The FAA contended that since the
authorizing statute had not been fully funded and the
appropriations period had closed the court could not order relief
for the plaintiff. The D.C. Circuit held that not only could it do
so but that it must order payment notwithstanding the lack of a
137
Congressional appropriation in the interest of justice.
Perhaps the most striking example occurs in the case of socalled Bivens actions. Under a Bivens claim, an individual can
bring suit against federal officials for a violation of a
Constitutional provision absent any federal statute establishing a
138
private cause of action. What was quickly recognized in the
literature is that providing a private cause of action against the
federal government for money damages is effectively the same
as the court itself directly engaging in spending federal resources
139
as a remedy to a Constitutional violation. This is especially
140
true in light of Watson v. City of Memphis, which rejected the
141
inability of the government to afford to comply as a defense.
In other words, if a Constitutional cause of action must have
a remedy, finding a cause is the same as finding that the courts
have the remedial power to resolve the cause. In a contempt
134. See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the
Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 768-71 (2001).
135. Id. at 770-71.
136. 556 F.2d 52 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
137. Id. at 56-57.
138. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Defendants of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971). Technically a Bivens action creates a right to recover from federal
officers, although in most cases the federal government indemnifies federal employees
with respect to such claims. See, e.g., F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
139. See Walter E. Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972).
140. 373 U.S. 526 (1963).
141. See Ridgway, supra note 28 at 97.
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hearing the courts can offer federal officers to pay fines to the
court regardless if such amounts have been appropriated by
Congress. In a Jacksonville Port Authority type case the court
can order funds specifically not appropriated by Congress. In a
Bivens action, the court can order the federal government to
spend money (in the form of damages) irrespective of the
existence of a federal statute authorizing such spending. These
examples look remarkably similar to a federal court ordering
spending, and the necessary revenue raising, not otherwise
authorized by Congress.
It may be that granting money damages for the violation
of a non-monetary Constitutional right is a good idea or a bad
142
idea. But what if the Constitutional violation itself involves
a failure to spend money, such as in the debt ceiling case? In
that case, the only possible remedy can be spending the
money. Then what relevance does Marbury have? The
relevance is that the Supreme Court cannot craft a remedy
that would itself independently violate the Constitution. The
Court in Marbury held that something as simple as physical
delivery of a judicial commission was outside of the scope of
judicial remedy because the authorizing statute itself was
unconstitutional.
Similarly, the Court cannot order the President to raise the
money needed to remedy the violation when the President
faces a Constitutional trilemma, since such a decision would
force the President to violate an independent Constitutional
provision such as the Article II clause that the President
143
faithfully execute the laws of the United States. Presumably,
therefore, the Court cannot order the President to issue debt
that the President is not permitted to issue by statute, nor can it
order Congress to enact a statute either increasing taxes or
144
authorizing additional debt.
This returns the analysis to the two options facing the Court
145
above: (1) impose taxes, or (2) issue debt. As between these
142. See Jeffries, supra note 2; Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the Fourth
Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994); Akhil Reed Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994).
143. See Strahilevitz, supra note 65.
144. See Jeffries, supra note 2. In some ways, this is conceptually related to the socalled “anti-commandeering” doctrine. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct 2566 (2012). See
also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
145. A third option, reducing spending, is not considered because it is presumed that
the Constitutional violation itself involves some failure to spend in violation of Article II,
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment, or otherwise. See supra p. 136. In other words,
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two, does one independently implicate the Constitution? Again,
the answer is yes. The Constitution requires that all measures
relating to revenues must originate in the House of
146
Representatives. While this provision has often been seen
mostly as a formality, recent scholarship has begun to argue that
147
it in fact does, and should, have substantive force. If this is
true, the Court directly raising revenue through the direct
imposition of taxes under its inherent Article III power could be
troubling from a Constitutional standpoint.
What then of option (2)? As Professors Buchanan and Dorf
argue, of all the options this appears to raise the least number of
148
Constitutional concerns. Assuming there is a Constitutional
violation, the federal courts have the power to hear the case, and
if a coordinate branch attempts to prevent that from occurring,
the courts are obligated to directly impose a remedy—in this
case, to directly order the Department of Treasury to issue debt
obligations in the amount and type determined by the Court to
be sufficient to remedy the violation.
This is precisely what the district court did in Jenkins.
Although most famously the district court ordered the
imposition and collection of property taxes, it also ordered the
issuance of bonds. Again, the only infirmity of this remedy held
by the Supreme Court was that the district court should have
provided KCMSD an opportunity to do so of its own design
before directly imposing such remedies under principles of
comity. As discussed above, comity simply cannot apply in this
case. Of the two remedies adopted by the district court in
Jenkins, the one that makes the most sense in this context is for
the Court to directly issue bonds.
That does not mean that this inherent Article III remedial
power is necessarily limited to issuing debt, however. In
circumstances where the Constitutional violation would require
directly imposing taxes it is possible to think of a situation in
149
which the Court could do so.

while Congress might have avoided the Constitutional issue in the first place by reducing
spending, once the Constitutional violation arises due to lack of spending an order
reducing spending would not remedy the violation.
146. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
147. See, e.g., Erik M. Jensen, THE TAXING POWER: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2005) at 170–71; Rebecca M. Kysar, On the
Constitutionality of Tax Treaties, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2012).
148. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 31.
149. Cf. Ludwin, supra note 131.
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For example, assume a situation where the Congress and
the President enact a hypothetical tax law called the Marriage
Equality Tax Act. Under the META, married couples who
receive a “marriage bonus” are obligated to pay a special tax to
offset this bonus while married couples who receive a “marriage
150
penalty” will receive a subsidy to offset the penalty. Crucially,
in addition META requires that the penalties and bonuses be
revenue-neutral, that is, that no tax revenue be raised or lost
through these payments. It turns out that this is not possible,
since whether taxpayers face a marriage penalty or marriage
bonus depends on, among other factors, whether the married
couple has a sole primary earner or dual earners. This means
that in some years there could be significantly greater
marriage bonuses while in others there could be greater
marriage penalties.
The President, facing a situation in which there is no way to
comply with the bonus, penalty, and revenue-neutrality
provisions all at the same time, chooses to comply with the
bonus and revenue-neutrality provisions. This results in some
couples who face the marriage penalty receiving a check to offset
the penalty while others do not. Married couples not receiving
the offset check sue claiming a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The courts agree, yet
they cannot order the President to issue offset checks to the
plaintiffs without ordering the President to violate Article II of
the Constitution by directly violating the revenue-neutrality
151
clause of META. Striking down the revenue-neutrality clause
alone is not an option since, based on the assumptions above, it
was integral to the entire statute. Under a severability analysis
the entire statute would have to be struck down if a core part is
unconstitutional.
But
there
is
nothing
necessarily
unconstitutional about the entire statute on its face, so there is
little justification to strike down the entire statute. Instead, the
150. See, e.g., Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and White,
65 U. CIN. L. REV. 787 (1997). In reality, Congress adopted marriage-penalty relief
provisions but permitted the marriage bonus to continue, effectively choosing to reduce
revenue to move towards marriage neutrality rather than adopt a budget neutrality
approach.
151. This differs from similar cases where Congress in subsequent years chose not to
fully fund certain programs found in earlier authorizing statutes. In such cases, the courts
ordered pro rata division of the shortfall as a way to avoid a conflict between the
mandates of an earlier authorizing statute and the funding of a subsequent
appropriations bill. See City of Los Angeles v. Adams, 556 F.2d 40 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In
the hypothetical the conflicting mandates are in a single statute and thus the City of Los
Angeles approach does not apply.
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Court orders that the marriage bonus tax be increased in an
amount sufficient to raise the revenue necessary to pay the offset
checks, mitigating the Constitutional violation without striking
down the entire statute.
While this is obviously a vastly over-simplified example, it
demonstrates just how powerful the remedial power of the Court
to tax and borrow can be. Whenever a statute, for political
reasons or otherwise, puts the President in a position where a
Constitutional violation must arise, the Court would have the
power to resolve the Constitutional violation on its own accord.
In situations where an order to Congress or the President to
resolve the violation would itself violate the Constitution, this
leads to the conclusion that the Court must directly adopt the
appropriate remedy to effectuate its Article III power.
III. CONCLUSION
What should happen when Congress and the President find
themselves in a fiscal policy showdown resulting in a
Constitutional violation? This question has risen to the fore in
light of the recent showdowns over the so-called “debt ceiling”
and whether the United States might default on its debt. But the
question is one that reaches far beyond just the debt ceiling
debate. Rather, it implicates the broader issue of the proper role
of the coordinate branches of government to function properly
within the Constitutional framework.
To this end, this Essay analyzes the proper role of the
federal courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, in
remedying Constitutional violations arising from fiscal policy
showdowns between Congress and the President. In such
circumstances, this Essay demonstrates, the courts can, and
should, have an independent fiscal power under Article III of
the Constitution. While this may seem radical at first glance, it is
merely an extension of the well-established powers of the federal
courts to remedy Constitutional violations in other settings.
Looked at from this perspective the Article III fiscal power
makes sense, both from a doctrinal and theoretical point of view.
Through a robust, but limited and well-demarcated Article III
fiscal power, the country can avoid continuing Constitutional
Crises arising over the use of the fiscal power, whether it be in
the context of the debt ceiling, the tax laws, or otherwise. Only
in this manner can the full extent of the Constitution’s fiscal
power be realized.
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